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Paragraphê and the Merits
Edwin Carawan
On Archinus’ suggestion you enacted a law that if anyone
should bring a suit contrary to the oaths, the defendant could
make a special plea; the magistrates would introduce this issue
first and the man who brought the special plea would speak first.
Whoever lost would pay a one-sixth penalty, so that those who
dared to recall past wrongs (mnêsikakein) would not only be convicted as perjurers, but would also be penalized immediately,
without awaiting punishment from the gods.1

N

after democracy was restored, Archinus introduced a special remedy against lawsuits that violated
the oaths and covenants of the Amnesty. This procedure for paragraphê was to be one of the defining reforms of
the new regime; inspired by the reconciliation agreement and
broadly adapted in later law, no other procedure is better
represented in the extant speeches. The distinctive features are
described here in the prologue to Isocrates’ speech Against
Callimachus: the archon will introduce this issue first and the
defendant will speak first, challenging the suit against him; the
loser will owe a penalty of one-sixth the amount at issue. So it is
that Isocrates’ client speaks first, as he is the defendant: he
OT LONG

1 Isoc. 18.2–3: εἰπόντος Ἀρϱχίνου νόµον ἔθεσθε, ἄν τις δικϰάζηται παρϱὰ
τοὺς ὅρϱκϰους, ἐξεῖναι τῷ φεύγοντι παρϱαγρϱάψασθαι, τοὺς δ’ ἄρϱχοντας περϱὶ
τούτου πρϱῶτον εἰσάγειν, λέγειν δὲ πρϱότερϱον τὸν παρϱαγρϱαψάµενον, ὁπότερϱος δ’ ἂν ἡττηθῇ, τὴν ἐπωβελίαν ὀφείλειν, ἵν’ οἱ τολµῶντες µνησικϰακϰεῖν
µὴ µόνον ἐπιορϱκϰοῦντες ἐξελέγχοιντο µηδὲ τὴν παρϱὰ τῶν θεῶν τιµωρϱίαν
ὑποµένοιεν ἀλλὰ κϰαὶ παρϱαχρϱῆµα ζηµιοῖντο. Transl. Mirhady, in David C.
Mirhady and Yun Lee Too, Isocrates I (Austin 2000) 98. Elsewhere translations are my own except where noted. In this study “the Amnesty” refers
to the diallagai of 403.
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challenges the plaintiff’s claim (10,000 drachmas) for money
that was confiscated under the oligarchy, on the grounds that it
violates the Amnesty. If the paragraphê goes against him, Callimachus will owe one-sixth of that sum. In that respect, the
roles are reversed: the defendant becomes plaintiff.2
This testimony is open to interpretation and the other evidence is often equivocal, but it was concluded long ago that the
new procedure involves a two-stage trial.3 That the archons
shall “introduce this issue first” seems to imply that there is first
a hearing to determine whether the suit is admissible, and then,
if the challenge is rejected, the court takes up the original complaint.4 Whoever loses on the procedural issue would owe the
epôbelia, whatever the outcome on the main suit; for, supposedly, the paragraphê requires a separate decision.
The later cases refer to statutes barring lawsuits for procedural errors, as in Roman exceptiones,5 and it has been
supposed that paragraphê was available in all such cases as, for
instance, when a suit was brought in the wrong court (exceptio
fori). Such is the plea opposed by Lysias 23 Against Pancleon (the
2 Thus R. Dareste, Les Plaidoyers civils de Démosthène (Paris 1875) xx: “Le
défendeur qui opposait la paragraphè devenait demandeur non pas seulement aux fins de son exception, mais pour tout le letige. Il parlait le premier
sur la fin de non-recevoir d’abord, et ensuite sur le fond, car la question du
fond n’était pas réservée, et il fallait toujours plaider à toutes fins. Les rôles
des parties se trouvaient ainsi complétement renversés, à ce point que le
reject de la paragraphè entrainait contre celui qui l’avait opposée condamnation à l’épobélie.” Cf. Dem. 34.4, κϰατηγορϱεῖν τοῦ διώκϰοντος.
3 This was already assumed by M. H. E. Meier and G. F. Schömann, Der
attische Process (Halle 1824) 645–647; followed by J. Lipsius, Das attische Recht
und Rechtsverfahren III (Leipzig 1915) 846. By their view the epôbelia is assessed
(at least in the later cases) if either party fails to win one-fifth of the votes.
4 Largely from the late lexicographers, Lipsius, Recht III 857 n.39, concluded that both paragraphê and diamartyria led to “delayed judgments,”
ἀναβόλιµοι δίκϰαι. To the contrary, W. Hellebrand, “Παρϱαγρϱαφή,” RE 18
(1949) 1169–1181, at 1176.
5 Or praescriptiones; but see U. E. Paoli, Studi sul processo attico (Padua 1933)
120, against the parallel.

—————
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only instance roughly contemporary with Isoc. 18): there the
defendant’s maneuver is called antigraphê and there is little
similarity to the later pleas called paragraphai; yet scholars have
often assumed that it is a variation on Archinus’ model. The
procedure was evolving, but the basis for it was, as Wilamowitz
described it, just such “form- oder competenzfrage.”6
On this reckoning the procedure that Archinus introduced
soon after 403/2 was an ad hoc solution to a singular problem,7
and this technical solution opened the door to other procedural
objections in the later paragraphai. Initially this recourse was
based on the claim that the suit was in violation of a general
amnesty (as it is usually interpreted), and thereafter it could be
adapted to unrelated objections, precisely because it was
originally and essentially a procedural remedy divorced from
“the merits.”
The idea that such questions should be decided separately
from the main issue is a mainstain of legal thinking, of course,
in both the Roman and common-law traditions. In Roman law
procedural exceptions were regularly decided in the preliminary hearing before the magistrate, in jure. In the American
system, for instance, an appellate court may reconsider questions of law but refuse to reconsider the lower court’s verdict on
factual issues; for the jury’s sovereignty as “trier of fact” is enshrined in the Bill of Rights.8 So it seemed reasonable to sup6 Aristoteles und Athen (Berlin 1893) II 368–373. Wilamowitz sees the time
constraint as indicating a second stage of the trial: “offenbar hatte er wenig
wasser, weil diese vorfrage erst von der eigentlichen abgetrennt worden
war” (369). We return to this problematic case at 259–261 below.
7 For the date of Archinus’ reform see D. Whitehead, “Athenian Laws
and Lawsuits in the Late Fifth Century B.C.,” MusHelv 59 (2002) 71–96;
followed (for the most part) by E. Carawan, “The Athenian Law of Agreement,” GRBS 46 (2006) 339–374.
8 The rule derives from the Seventh Amendment: “In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined by any court in the United States than according to the rules of
the common law.”

—————
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pose that a comparable division of issues emerged at Athens.
But then Paoli presented an alternative construction:9 the
real issue for the Athenian jury to decide, in civil suits where
paragraphê applies, is whether to authorize the plaintiff to carry
out his claim (demand payment or seize assets in lieu of payment), and the legalities cannot be severed from that reckoning.
So there was no two-stage trial, with a separate hearing on the
procedural question. Instead, the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s challenge are introduced in the same hearing (the
latter first); and, if the paragraphê is rejected, the same jury proceeds directly to a second ballot on the original complaint.10
That unified procedure respects the principle of “inscindibilità”: there is no divide between the substantive rights and the
process to exercise them. After all, the extant paragraphai show
that the plaintiffs argued their case on the merits, and even the
defendant, though insisting that plaintiff’s claims be barred, devoted much of his argument to answering their claims.
To illustrate Paoli’s model: in Isoc. 18 the issue is whether
Callimachus will be authorized to demand payment or seize
Paoli, Processo 77–116; followed by Hellebrand, RE 18 (1949) 1178–
1179, and A. Biscardi, “Giudizi paragrafici,” in A. Azura and E. Eula (eds.),
Novissimo Digesto Italiano VII (Turin 1961) 879–880. Also skeptical of a
second hearing: Dareste, Plaidoyers xx (quoted n.2 above); J. Miles, “Some
Observations on Demosthenes’ Speech against Pantaenetus,” Hermathena 85
(1955) 50–66. Cf. A. Steinwenter’s review of Paoli, ZRG 54 (1934) 382–387,
suggesting that the protocol varied and evolved over time (esp. 385).
10 In his conclusions Paoli outlines the sequence as follows (Processo 113–
114): “Quando il convenuto avesse prescelto questo mezzo de difesa [i.e.,
paragraphê], ne derivavano delle notevoli conseguenze procedurali. Il principio che reus in excipiendo actor fit influiva anche sulla forma del giudizio in
quanto: 1) il convenuto aveva per primo la parola, e lasciava perciò
all’attore quel vantaggio, che tutte le legislazioni antiche e moderne
attribuiscono al convenuto o all’accusato, di poter chiudere il dibattito; 2)
se l’eccezione non riportava il quinto dei voti, il convenuto era colpito da
un’ammenda, ἐπωβελία … Il magistrato che aveva la direzione del dibattito
… doveva, terminata l’orazione del convenuto e dell’attore, sottoporre alla
votazione del giudici anzitutto la questione paragrafica, quindi, a meno che
l’eccezione non fosse stata accolta, l’ἔγκϰληµα dell’ attore.”
9

—————
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assets, if Isocrates’ client will not settle; and our unnamed defendant (NN) has a good deal to say against the merits of
Callimachus’ claim, insisting that he is lying about what happened. He expects Callimachus to respond by arguing his case
on the facts at issue in the hearing at hand. So, if the paragraphê
is rejected, there is really nothing left to argue over; the jury
will cast a second ballot, now on the original complaint.
Wolff set out to disprove Paoli’s theory and largely succeeded.11 But Wolff himself was not so categorical as his
followers have been. Some of his findings may tell conclusively
against Paoli but not so unequivocally in favor of his own
construction. On balance, it seems reasonable to reject Paoli’s
double verdict, but the old two-stage trial remains precarious.
Wolff’s argument against Paoli turns on two disparate findings. (1) There is no evidence or clear indication of the second
ballot; that much is indisputable. But (2) Wolff argues that the
extant speeches are in fact well-focused on the procedural issue,
the paragraphê itself; and that finding is not so conclusive. Most
readers have been struck by how much the speeches labor the
merits, but Wolff discounts that impression as “an optical illusion.”12 In that regard, we should at least give the speeches
another reading. And in his finding against the double verdict,
Wolff himself scrupulously acknowledged, neither is there any
clear reference to a second hearing, if the paragraphê is rejected.
Following those implications, this essay offers a new model:
(§1) In paragraphai there is no second stage to the trial—neither
11 H. J. Wolff, Die attische Paragraphe: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Auflockerung
archaischer Prozeßformen (Weimar 1966). Cf. A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of
Athens II (Oxford 1971) 108–119; D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical
Athens (Ithaca 1978) 215, concluding “Paoli’s view “has been decisively
refuted by Wolff’s detailed study”; S. C. Todd The Shape of Athenian Law
(Oxford 1993) 138, “Paoli’s hypothesis … was demolished by Wolff.” Wolff
himself showed admirable caution in his conclusions (84–85), even acknowledging the value of “inscindibilità” in a diminished sense.
12 E.g., Paragraphe 17 n.1: “dieser Eindruck … das Ergebnis einer optischen Täuschung war…”

—————
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Paoli’s second ballot nor Wolff’s second hearing. Each invoked
the silence of our sources against the rival theory, but the
evidence weighs against them both. And (§2) the litigants
themselves are not so keen on the divide between fact and formality as later rhetoricians would be.13 From the first example
to the last, the paragraphai represented in the speeches involve a
peculiarly contractual principle. In the case against Callimachus, the question for the jurors to decide is whether earlier
agreements (including the Amnesty of 403) have preempted the
claim. Similar issues predominate in the later instances: after
an arbitrated settlement or binding agreement, is the plaintiff’s
claim foreclosed or already fulfilled in accordance with the
covenants?14 This is not to deny that other, purely technical
objections were also acknowledged, as paragraphai came to be
more widely applied. But, in the cases documented by the
speeches, the issues that emerge from the claim and the challenge lend themselves to a single decision. If the paragraphe is
rejected, the plaintiff’s claim is affirmed and he will proceed to
demand payment or seize assets in compensation. After all,
Isocrates’ client, in explaining what appears to be an unfamiliar
procedure, never says that the jury must reach a separate decision
first on the paragraphê, only that this is introduced first and the defendant will speak first.
But let us first try to gain some perspective on Pancleon’s
case (Lys. 23), as it is often treated as the missing link in the
two-trial model. The speech tells us little or nothing about the
original complaint but, aside from that silence, there is no sign

The scholarly division of issues seems better suited to the later rhetorica
than to the fourth-century realities; cf. E. Carawan, “What the Laws Have
Prejudged: Παρϱαγρϱαφή and Early Issue-Theory,” in C. Wooten (ed.), The
Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome (Leiden 2001) 17–51. The entry
in Pollux 8.57, in particular, relies on later rhetorical hypotheses (on fictitious issues).
14 Paoli supposed, “very likely, in all cases where ‘the obligation was
extinct’ it was possible to pose an exception by paragraphê” (Processo 95–96).
13

—————
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of a separate hearing on the merits.15 To be sure, the text we
have addresses only the procedural issue,16 answering Pancleon’s claim, that the suit cannot be tried in the polemarch’s
court because he has citizen rights; but that does not mean that
this was all the plaintiff had to say in the hearing at hand. The
tale of his damages, whatever wrong Pancleon has done him,
may be so straightforward as to need no speechwriter’s art; the
text begins with the sort of formula that might often suffice,
when a speaker turns from his narrative to a complicated
issue.17 So our plaintiff probably consulted the speechwriter
only in regard to the more complicated question raised by
Pancleon’s antigraphê.18 And on that issue he concludes his argument with a telling parallel (13–14): when Aristodicus brought
suit against Pancleon, the defendant raised the same objection,
that he could not be sued as an alien because he was (as he
claimed) a Plataean. In that instance the objection was quashed
by sworn testimony (diamartyria), without jury trial. In that
parallel case Pancleon’s plea is simply called his antomosia (his
formal response to the charge), and that may be all it is in this
15 Cf. Edward Cohen’s reply to S. C. Todd, “Status and Contract in
Fourth-Century Athens,” in G. Thür (ed.), Symposion 1993 (Cologne 1994)
146–149.
16 The formula µὴ εἰσαγώγιµον εἶναι does not always indicate a paragraphê (for trial): see 274–276 below; recall that Callimachus’ claim had been
quashed by a diamartyria, sworn testimony that the case was not admissible
because of a prior settlement: οὐκϰ εἰσαγώγιµος ἦν ἡ δίκϰη διαίτης γεγενηµένης (11). This was before Archinus introduced the new procedure; so, if
there were no witness willing to swear, the defendant would have had to
argue that point at trial on the main claim (just as Antiph. 5 argues abuse of
procedure). On the sense of eisagein/eisagôgimos, see at nn.60, 71 below.
17 πολλὰ µὲν λέγειν, ὦ ἄνδρϱες δικϰασταί, περϱὶ τουτουὶ τοῦ πρϱάγµατος
οὔτ’ ἂν δυναίµην οὔτε µοι δοκϰεῖ δεῖν. The deictic τουτουὶ suggests that he
has at least summarized his grievances. For similar paraleipsis cf. Dem. 23.90
(περϱὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου πολλὰ µὲν λέγειν οὐκϰ οἶµαι δεῖν), 40.38, 18.50; Isoc.
20.153.
18 K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley 1968) 165, suggests
that Lys. 23 is a client copy, showing the client’s own alterations.

—————
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instance—antigraphê usually means no more than the text of the
counterclaim.19 The case at hand has come before a jury because (apparently) Lysias’ client has not found anyone willing
to deny under oath that Pancleon is a citizen (to decide the case
as Aristodicus did, by diamartyria). But there is nothing to suggest that Pancleon’s plea is now any different. And, aside from
the missing narrative, there is nothing to suggest that this case
will be given a separate hearing on the merits, when Pancleon’s
antigraphê is rejected. Indeed the speaker concludes with the
usual injunction to the jury, as though the verdict in this hearing will decide the case, not just the procedural issue (16): οἶδ’
ὅτι τά τε δίκϰαια κϰαὶ τἀληθῆ ψηφιεῖσθε, ἃ κϰαὶ ἐγὼ ὑµῶν δέοµαι.
From these considerations I conclude that Pancleon’s case
does not tell us much about early paragraphai. Whatever it may
say about evolving procedure, it does not refer to a separate
hearing on the merits.
Whatever we make of the case against Pancleon, the other
instances are very different disputes. In each example, from the
case against Callimachus down to the latest of the mercantile
suits, there is a tangle of questions that must be argued ab initio:
Are the claims to contract or legal settlement fair or fraudulent? And where do we draw the line between the rights
recognized in the agreement and further claims that were not
clearly addressed?
1. A hearing on the merits
Wolff’s scenario proceeds as follows:
Of course, introducing a paragraphê delays the debate on the
merits of the case and leads immediately to a preliminary that is
independent, though the main issue remains pending. In procedural terms, this means that, if the paragraphê is rejected, there
is no need to initiate the case anew, but, rather, the magistrate
now brings that issue before the court. The question whether
19 Cf. Dem. 45.45–46, reporting the antigraphai in the suit for false testimony against Stephanus. Pancleon’s case would be the only instance where
a paragraphê is called antigraphê.

—————
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this sequel was before the same jury that decided the preliminary or a newly allotted panel, would be of no consequence; it
depends on whether there is enough time remaining, after the
preliminary concludes, to bring the main issue to a conclusion
before the same judges, on the same day.20

This picture involves some awkward complications, both with
regard to the practical arrangements and in the juristic
rationale. Athenian justice seems to have followed the principle
that trials begin and end on the same day—even in cases of life
and death (Pl. Ap. 37C).21 But if the second hearing proceeds in
the same court on the same day, there may be some confusion
when the tables turn.22 These complications can be managed,
of course, but it is surprising that there is no mention of them.
Let us begin with what our sources do not say and then proceed to the recourse they recognize.
As Wolff emphasized, “nowhere, not even in the speeches
Paragraphe 84–85 (the emphasis is his): “Zwar verhinderte die Einlegung
einer Paragraphe einstweilen die Einführung des Meritums und führte zunächst zur Instruktion eines selbständigen Vorprozesses, doch hob sie die
Anhängigkeit der Hauptsache nicht auf. Prozeßrechtlich ausgedrückt heißt
das, daß es nach Zurückweisung der Paragraphe keiner erneuten Einbringung
(λαγχάνειν) der δίκϰη bedurfte, sondern der Magistrat nun ihre Einführung
beim Dikasterion bewirkte. Ob dies dann dasselbe Dikastenkollegium war,
das über den Vorprozeß entschieden hatte, oder ein neu ausgelostes, wird
ohne Belang gewesen sein und davon abgehangen haben, ob nach Beendigung des Vorprozesses noch genügend Zeit übrig war, um die Hauptsache
am selben Tage vor den gleichen Richtern zu Ende zu führen.”
21 Ian Worthington has argued for the exception in cases such as the
apophasis against Demosthenes in 323 (and he may be right): “The Length of
an Athenian Public Trial: a Reply to Professor MacDowell,” Hermes 131
(2003) 364–371. But such exceptions hardly disprove the rule: even for capital cases, the trial should ordinarily conclude in a day. In private suits we
have no sign of an exception.
22 From one vote to the next, the jurors will assign the opposite meaning
to their ballots: in the paragraphê, the first urn or pierced ballot will be for the
defendant, the second urn or solid ballot for the plaintiff; then at the main
hearing, presumably, the plaintiff would speak first, so the pierced ballot is
in his favor (on ballot arrangements see Todd, Shape 132–133).
20

—————
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opposing paragraphai, is there any mention at all of the need to
renew the suit”; he takes that silence as a sign that, if the
paragraphê were rejected, the court would proceed directly to a
hearing on the merits.23 Presumably the procedural sequence
was well known, and so, supposedly, a decision against the
defendant on the paragraphê would lead directly to a trial on the
original complaint, without any further formalities and without
comment. Yet, if there is to be a separate hearing on the merits
—and the jurors will not quite be done with the case when they
reject the paragraphê—we might expect plaintiffs to say something to that effect, somewhere in the corpus of speeches on
paragraphai. The speakers (on both sides) never say anything of
the sort. Wolff admitted as much, as the same silence tells
against Paoli’s model;24 but his followers have not been satisfied
with that disclaimer or the uncertainty about when the main
hearing would come.
Thus MacDowell supposed that the hearing on the main
issue would have to be decided “at a later date” and he found
this indicated in the prologue to Dem. 36, For Phormio: τὴν µὲν
οὖν παρϱαγρϱαφὴν ἐποιησάµεθα τῆς δίκϰης οὐχ ἵν᾽᾿ ἐκϰκϰρϱούοντες
χρϱόνους ἐµποιῶµεν (2).25 Here, supposedly, “the speaker denies
that the postponement of the trial … was his motive.” But that
denial might simply mean that they did not introduce the
paragraphê in order to derail the arbitration, where the suit began and might have reached a conclusion.26 After all, Phormio
23 Paragraphe 85: “nirgends, auch nicht in den zur Abwehr von Paragraphai gehaltenen Reden, von der etwaigen Notwendigkeit einer neuerlichen
Klagerhebung die Rede ist.”
24 Paragraphe 83: “Spricht somit keine Quelle für grundsätzlich ungebrochene Kontinuität der Verhandlung zu Paragraphe und Meritum, so gilt
allerdings das gleiche auch für das Gegenteil.”
25 MacDowell, Law 215. Against “the usual view,” cf. Miles, Hermathena
85 (1955) 64–65, finding it “absurd that the whole case should be re-tried
after the parties had already argued fully on the merits and the facts …
Surely the hearing of the plea would be regarded as a trial of the action.”
26 On the effect of entering a paragraphê in arbitration see S. Isager and M.

—————
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had reached a settlement with his litigious step-son on two
previous occasions, and it was probably assumed that he would
settle yet again. If the speaker had meant to disavow a delay
within the proceedings at hand, he would probably have said
so more plainly: “Our aim was not to postpone your verdict.”27
Instead he speaks of prolonging the dispute more generally and
with obvious irony; for endless litigation—on the part of Apollodorus—is a major theme of the speech.
If Wolff’s scenario holds true, we might especially expect the
plaintiffs to say something about the second stage of the proceedings, where their claims would be given a proper hearing:
“Put these technicalities aside and give us a fair trial—today!”
The closest approximation is Dem. 35.43, where the plaintiff
calls on the judges to “demand that [defendant Lacritus] show
either that they did not receive the money, or that they repaid
it, or that maritime contracts need not be valid, or that they
should use the money in any other way than under the terms of
the contract.” Now the defendant has already made the first
speech, so it is fair to ask, when or how will he have the chance
to respond? Wolff saw this injunction to the jury as a veiled demand for them to reject the paragraphê and proceed to the main
issue.28 But it seems out of character for this plaintiff, who is so
emphatic about every detail of the proceedings, to speak so
obliquely of his one chance of success. It seems more his style
to demand that the jury voice their outrage directly (in thorubos),
___
H. Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C. (Odense 1975)
124–125.
27 As Paoli remarked, Processo 107: “se avesse voluto accennare al
differimento del giudizio principale avrebbe detto οὐχ ἵνα τὴν κϰρϱίσιν ἀναβαλλώµεθα.”
28 Paragraphe 78: “nichts anderes als das in rhetorische Form gekleidete
Verlangen, dem Beklagten durch Zurückweisung seiner Paragraphe die
direkte Verteidigung und damit das voraussichtlich hoffnungslose Suchen
nach tragfähigen Gegenbeweisen aufzuzwingen.” Of course, the “veiled
demand” may be simply a commonplace from contract cases where the
plaintiff speaks first.

—————
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and let Lacritus try to answer; the aim is to catch him off
guard.29
Of course, in the corpus of eight speeches that seem fairly
complete we have only two for the plaintiffs: Dem. 34 and 35.30
But these seem largely representative and consistent with the
defendants’ speeches in this respect: the litigants (on both sides)
would try to exhaust the arguments they would use in any
hearing on the merits. In fact we might have supposed that the
plaintiffs’ speeches were actually written for hearings on the
main issue, were it not for brief passages disposing of the plea
to bar litigation. Thus in the speech Against Phormio (Dem. 34)
the plaintiffs waste few words on the paragraphê (3–5) and then
rely almost entirely on the testimony to what happened (only
reverting to the paragraphê in conclusion, 43–45). The issue is
whether the defendant (another Phormio) must pay off the penalty under a contract he made to deliver a cargo to Athens; the
defendant contends that the contract is no longer valid because
the ship was lost at sea (and the contract recognizes that
exigency); so he has invoked the law allowing paragraphê in cases
The dismissive εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων οἷός τ’ εἴη οὗτος οὔτε
διδάξαι οὔτε πεῖσαι (“I’m confident that he could neither explain or persuade (you) of anything”) suggests that AA expects to catch Lacritus with no
answer (much as Plato’s Socrates catches Meletus, Ap. 34A–B). So this was
probably a demand for spontaneous response. It is also possible that the
litigants had a brief rebuttal after the first round of speeches (as the anonymous referee suggested); that would match the sequence for ordinary dikai
(Ath.Pol. 67.2).
30 Neither does Hyperides(?) Against Demeas (P.Oxy. XXVII 2464) give any
sign of a subsequent hearing on the merits, but it is too fragmentary to carry
any weight. The only passage indicating a paragraphê is col. iii.11–24: AA
protests the contradiction, if the law establishes guardians for orphans, to
safeguard their interests, but the jury should decide that suit against the
wrongdoing guardians be barred (µὴ εἰσαγώγιµον εἶναι ψηφίζ[ο]ι̣σθε).
Here Wolff observes (Paragraphe 19), “Apparently all that the plaintiff aims to
achieve is quashing the paragraphê; for him the main issue is a cura posterior.”
But we hardly have enough of the connected argument to draw that conclusion. In this essay I also avoid questions of authenticity, indicating by the
attibution “Dem.” only that a speech belongs to the Demosthenic corpus.
29
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where there is no contractual obligation (symbolaion). In response, the plaintiff introduces a barrage of testimony on every
stage of the voyage (6–16), to show how Phormio has systematically cheated him of payment and security; and then a second
speaker turns back to the sequence of litigation to discredit
Phormio’s scenario and his chief witness, Lampis (who initially
denied taking payment and then in arbitration admitted it).
This line of argument takes up most of the rest of the speech,
up to what appears to be a commonplace in such cases: If the
case is rejected here, what recourse is there—“to what court
shall we take our case, … if not to you (in the jurisdiction)
where we made the contract?” (43). And, after one last attack
on Lampis, the speaker concludes, “I have said all that I can.
But I shall call another to speak in our behalf, if you require it.”
Evidently the plaintiffs mean to say all that they have to say
in the hearing at hand. If the jurors want to hear more, they
will say so (in thorubos), and he will call the other speaker. If
there were the chance of a second hearing, we would expect
the litigant at least to allude to it: “If you have any reservations,
reject the paragraphê and let us proceed to the main event; then
we can answer any lingering doubts, and our opponent will
have to answer our argument on the merits.” But he does not
anticipate that option.
In the parallel passage, Dem. 35.47–49, the plaintiff develops
the commonplace in more detail: “Where must we turn for
justice?” If not here, where maritime suits are decided, perhaps
to the Eleven? But they deal with kakourgoi and capital crimes.
Perhaps to the archon eponymos? But he deals with disputes over
heiresses and orphans (etc.). Perhaps to the archon basileus? But
he deals with asebeia (etc.). Perhaps to the polemarch or the
generals? But these, again, have no jurisdiction over maritime
contracts.
The commonplace may have been inspired by the plea that
the court has no authority.31 But it has developed into a broad
31 Not precisely that the case is in the wrong jurisdiction but that there is
no court competent to hear it—no magistrate can “bring in” the claim (or
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response to paragraphai generally: If the remedy in this court is
disallowed, where can we turn for justice? That development
makes it all the more striking that, even after closing all the
other options, the plaintiff never says, “Let us proceed to a
proper debate on the merits.”
All the paragraphê speakers—plaintiffs and defendants alike—
conclude in much the same way, as though the debate at hand is
the only hearing on the merits.32 Of course the argument from
silence cannot be conclusive, but it must weigh at least as
heavily against Wolff’s model as against Paoli’s: if the absence
of any mention tells against a second ballot, surely it tells
against a second stage of the trial with another round of arguments. And there are passages where the silence is especially
persuasive, where the speaker turns to what recourse he has, if
he loses the paragraphê hearing.
The regular recourse is a suit against the witnesses.33 Such is
the case of Apollodorus against Stephanus (Dem. 45). As we
noted, Apollodorus had reopened some old claims against his
guardian Phormio, going back to the disposition of his inheritance, and this Phormio (not the plaintiff in Dem. 34) defeated
the suit by insisting that the matter was closed by prior settlement. Indeed, Demosthenes’ For Phormio presented a compelling argument on those grounds. So Apollodorus recalls:34
___
the claimant); cf. Wolff, Paragraphe 97–101. The law in Dem. 37.33 allows
paragraphai against suits for which there are no magistrates (περϱὶ ὧν οὐκϰ
εἰσὶν εἰσαγωγεῖς), but that objection was not the basis for the paragraphê (it
was deleted from the affidavit); see n.45 below.
32 E.g. Dem. 37.58–60, first focusing on the question of fact, to this effect:
How could I have done you any wrong when I wasn’t even in town? Then
defending the grounds for paragraphê: Even in homicide cases settlements are
binding; the most dire prospect is that the jurors may do away with the
ancient rule for final settlement. If there were a sequel, the defendant would
anticipate it: Do not be misled to think that you can reject the paragraphê and
do justice in the hearing that follows.
33 Cf. Dem. 34.28, 31, and esp. 46–48, implying that a suit for false witness is his only recourse.
34 Dem. 45.6: πρϱολαβὼν δέ µου ὥστε πρϱότερϱος λέγειν διὰ τὸ παρϱα-
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As he spoke before me and took advantage, because it was a
paragraphê hearing and was not going to trial on the main issue, he read
these documents (releasing Phormio from further obligation) …
and so affected the judges that they refused to hear any utterance from us; so I was penalized with the epôbelia, denied a fair
hearing and humiliated like no one else I know.

The picture of Apollodorus baffled by thorubos may not be quite
true to life, but the implication is plausible enough: he speaks as
though a suit that is contested by paragraphê goes to trial on that
basis and is not expected to proceed to a hearing on the main
issue. Of course the articular infinitive, τὸ παρϱαγρϱαφὴν εἶναι
κϰαὶ µὴ εὐθυδικϰίᾳ εἰσιέναι, may be a simplification, but the
whole tenor of the passage reinforces the sense of it.35 For
Apollodorus goes on to say (7) that he can only sympathize
with the judges who ruled against him, because the lying witnesses were so unscrupulous. If that jury had had the option of
dismissing the paragraphê and giving him a hearing on the
merits, surely Apollodorus would have alluded to that option,
to make the most of the due process that was denied him.
There is one other passage where defenders of the two-trial
model might be tempted to find an allusion to some subsequent
___
γρϱαφὴν εἶναι κϰαὶ µὴ εὐθυδικϰίᾳ εἰσιέναι, κϰαὶ ταῦτ’ ἀναγνοὺς κϰαὶ τἄλλ’ ὡς
αὑτῷ συµφέρϱειν ἡγεῖτο ψευσάµενος, οὕτω διέθηκϰε τοὺς δικϰαστάς, ὥστε
φωνὴν µηδ’ ἡντινοῦν ἐθέλειν ἀκϰούειν ἡµῶν· πρϱοσοφλὼν δὲ τὴν ἐπωβελίαν
κϰαὶ οὐδὲ λόγου τυχεῖν ἀξιωθείς, ἀλλ’ ὑβρϱισθεὶς ὡς οὐκϰ οἶδ’ εἴ τις πώποτ’
ἄλλος ἀνθρϱώπων. Isoc. 18.39 suggests that the plaintiff could avoid the
epôbelia by abandoning his case, but evidently Apollodorus at least tried to
argue his claim, the jury voted, and he was saddled with the fine.
35 Cf. Dem. 34.4: ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρϱ µὲν τῶν µὴ γενοµένων ὅλως συµβολαίων
Ἀθήνησι µηδ’ εἰς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐµπόρϱιον παρϱαγρϱάφεσθαι δεδώκϰασιν, ἐὰν δέ
τις γενέσθαι µὲν ὁµολογῇ, ἀµφισβητῇ δὲ ὡς πάντα πεποίηκϰεν τὰ συγκϰείµενα, ἀπολογεῖσθαι κϰελεύουσιν εὐθυδικϰίαν εἰσιόντα, οὐ κϰατηγορϱεῖν τοῦ
διώκϰοντος, “The laws have granted paragraphê in cases where there are no
contractual obligations at Athens or for an Athenian market; if one admits
that there is (a contract) but argues that he has done all that was agreed, (the
laws) order him to proceed to euthydikia and make his defense there, not to
accuse the plaintiff.” Again, the options, paragraphê and euthudikian eisienai, are
opposite paths to the verdict, with no sign that one would lead to the other.
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hearing: this is the remark by Isocrates’ client, at the end of a
passage anticipating what Callimachus will say, “soon it will be
possible to reply,” τάχ’ ἀντειπεῖν ἐξέσται.36 But scholars have
usually treated this as a reference to further arguments in the
same speech, and for good reason. This turn of the argument
begins (35–36) with the protest that Callimachus will make
(supposedly) at the injustice of being threatened with a fine
under the democracy (the epôbelia) for money that was taken
from him under the oligarchy. Against that complaint, our
speaker says, “I think it will be easy to reply” (ῥᾴδιον ἀντειπεῖν). He then proceeds to offer various considerations against
that complaint: all the democrats who came home from Peiraieus have suffered some loss, and yet none has resorted to
litigation of this sort (38). Moreover, Callimachus has the option “even now, before making trial of your judgment, to drop
the suit,” thus to be rid of the risk (39). So, if he speaks of the
wrongs done to him under the oligarchy, the jury must demand
that he show that the defendant—the man on trial—is the one
who has taken the money (40). The men the jury must condemn are those who committed the wrongs, not the innocent
(41). And so Isocrates concludes this section: πρϱὸς µὲν οὖν
τούτους τοὺς λόγους κϰαὶ ταῦτ’ ἴσως ἀρϱκϰέσει κϰαὶ τάχ’ ἀντειπεῖν
ἐξέσται. Mirhady translates: “In response to those arguments,
then, this is perhaps sufficient, and it will be possible now to
raise my own objections.” For this sentence introduces a
further defense of the Amnesty (42–50), calling upon the jury to
remember the conflict it delivered them from, when they cast
their votes (45); after which Isocrates turns to discrediting the
litigious tactics of Callimachus (51–57).
2. Framing the issue
Now let us weigh what the speeches do have to say about
what is at issue in paragraphai, beginning with the first instance
(a) and then proceeding to the later adaptations (b). Other
Isoc. 18.41, as suggested by the anonymous referee. Cf. Mirhady’s
translation, in Isocrates 105–106.
36
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readers were struck, as Paoli was, by how the speeches grapple
with the merits of the case, the facts in dispute and the evidence
on those claims. Wolff’s study was a tour de force in dispelling
that impression. But let us reconsider the key arguments, each
in its own context.
(a) Thus against Callimachus (as we saw above), the defendant calls for the jury to demand that the plaintiff address the
matter at issue, to show that the defendant—the man on trial—
is the one has taken the money, “that I am the one who caused
the damages he aims to recover.”37 As Paoli argued, that demand strongly suggests that the facts at issue will be decided in
the proceedings at hand. But, as Wolff insists, that point in the
argument has to be read in its historical context. It comes in
anticipation of claims that Callimachus will make linking NN
to the oligarchs: “If he recalls what happened under the oligarchy, don’t let him make accusations against them, for
crimes that no one will defend, but insist that he show that I
have taken the money.”
In Wolff’s view, this instruction to the jury is “nothing more
than a rhetorical device, to remind the judges emphatically,
that it is not the injustice at large in the era of the despotic
regime but solely the role of the defendant invidually that is at
issue” (83). He sees it as an appeal to a general amnesty and, in
that light, should not be construed as an argument on the
merits. After all (in his view), the other paragraphai are based on
technical rules, separate from issues of substance. And the basis
for paragraphê in this instance is the oath mê mnêsikakein that
Isocrates invokes in the prologue: the new procedure is a way
of enforcing a pledge against prosecuting the wrongs of civil
conflict. The amnesty thus amounts to an ad hoc limitation, and
challenging the lawsuit on this basis is typical of paragraphê, as a
37 Isoc. 18.40: ἂν δ’ ἄρϱα µεµνῆται τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρϱχίας γεγενηµένων,
ἀξιοῦτε αὐτὸν µὴ ’κϰείνων κϰατηγορϱεῖν, ὑπὲρϱ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἀπολογήσεται, ἀλλ’
ὡς ἐγὼ τὰ χρϱήµατα εἴληφα διδάσκϰειν, περϱὶ οὗπερϱ ὑµᾶς δεῖ ψηφίζεσθαι, µηδ’ ὡς αὐτός δεινὰ πέπονθεν ἀποφαίνειν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐγὼ πεποίηκϰα ἐξελέγχειν, παρϱ’ οὗπερϱ ἀξιοῖ τἀπολωλότα κϰοµίζεσθαι.
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matter quite apart from the substantive claim.
But mê mnêsikakein did not always mean “amnesty” in the
usual sense.38 In the earliest documents the oath “not to recall
wrong” seems to function as a closing upon the covenants of a
treaty or private settlement. In casual usage, of course, it may
suggest the moral burden of “forgiveness.” But where the
pledge is invoked as a rule that can be enforced, it regularly conveys
a bar against any further dispute on the matters resolved in the
agreement.39 So, in the era after 404, it does not imply a bar
38 Paoli, Processo 122–123: it is not until the second century B.C. that
amnêstia gains currency as “an act of clemency by the sovereign power.” The
Athenian Amnesty in particular, “differs juristically from the amnesty of our
positive law: in form, because it is not an act of indulgence by sovereign
power but a renunciation of the remedies allowed by law, by contractual
agreement on the part of the members of the two hostile factions; in substance, because it also cancels private suits [whereas modern amnesty deals
with criminal complaints]; in its processual function, because it does not take
effect ipso iure but must be invoked by the accused or defendant as an exception, that the plaintiff’s claim is inadmissible; in its extent, as it does not
extend ... to cases previously decided.”
39 So argued E. Carawan, “The Athenian Amnesty and the Scrutiny of
the Laws,” JHS 122 (2002) 1–23; on the contractual implications, GRBS 46
(2006) 368–374; cf. R. Waterfield, Why Socrates Died (New York 2009) 132–
134, treating mê mnêsikakein as a rule of “no reprise.” For the conventional
view (forgiveness by the victor): C. J. Joyce “The Athenian Amnesty and
Scrutiny of 403,” CQ 58 (2008) 507–518; cf. my reply, CQ forthcoming. For
the main comparanda see Astrid Dössel, Die Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte
in den griechischen Poleis (Frankfurt 2003). We may now add the well-preserved
text of a settlement at Dikaia on the Thermaic gulf with Perdiccas III as
witness and guarantor (364/3): E. Voutiras and K. Simanides, “Δικϰαιοπολιτῶν Συναλλαγαί. Μία νέα επιγρϱαφή από τη Δίκϰαια,” in Ancient Macedonia
VII (Thessaloniki 2007) 253–274. Here we have detailed arrangements for
lawsuits, within a time-limit, concluding with an oath that includes the
formulae (67–82) not to recall wrong “in word or deed” (κϰαὶ οὐ µνησικϰακϰήσω οὐδενὶ οὔτε λόγωι οὔτε ἔρϱγωι), to honor the pledges they have exchanged (πιστώµατα = συνθῆκϰαι), and to abide by the city’s verdicts (ἔν τε
ταῖς δίκϰαις αἷς ἐδίκϰασεν ἡ πόλις ἐµµενέω). For a deeper perspective on
syngnômê and comparable terms, see now David Konstan, Before Forgiveness
(Cambridge 2010).

—————

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 51 (2011) 254–295

272

PARAGRAPHÊ AND THE MERITS

against all retributive actions absolutely. The settlement (diallagai) included remedies for bloodshed and lost property. And it
did not bar recriminations for past liabilities to the polis—those
protections had to be enacted into law. A general immunity is
not at all what Isocrates implies where he explains the rationale
for his client’s paragraphê.
The lawsuit by Callimachus (C) violates “the oaths and covenants” in two ways: (1) C is prosecuting an accomplice, whose
role amounted to (at most) “informing or denouncing,” whereas the covenants expressly barred prosecution for such complicity. Moreover (2) whatever claim C could make upon our
defendant, he had settled in arbitration, and such decisions are
rendered final by a rule that was evidently embraced in the
covenants and promptly restated in statute. Of course, NN
argues that C is lying about the facts, as well, and those matters
of fact bear directly upon the legal issues: C probably argued
that NN was the instigator, chiefly responsible for the confiscation, and therefore was not protected by the covenant on informants. And C would claim that NN is lying about the
settlement: NN says that C would deny that there had been
any settlement at all. However it was framed, that justification
is disposed of in the first part of the argument (13–18) where
NN argues that the claim is indeed subject to the settlement
(however deficient his proof).40
The first guarantee is presented as the threshold for the
paragraphê: NN calls for a reading of the text (19) and then
summarizes it (20), “the covenants expressly absolve (διαρϱρϱήδην
ἀφιεισῶν) those who informed or denounced or did anything of
this sort” (ἐνδείξαντας ἢ φήναντας ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων
πρϱάξαντας). This paraphrase suggests that the clause was
broadly framed to encompass both those who initiated formal
proceedings (endeixis and phasis) and those were merely accom40 The received text gives no indication of any testimony to confirm the
fact of the settlement or the terms of it. Most editors assume a lacuna in §10,
to allow for testimony by the arbitrator Nicomachus.
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plices or accessories (as NN claims to be). Those who shared in
the proceeds of confiscation could not be prosecuted for that
complicity.
How that rule applies is illustrated in §23: we are told that
Thrasybulus and Anytus, though they know the men who listed
their property for confiscation (apograpsantes) “nonetheless do
not dare to bring suit against them or recall wrongs,” ὅµως οὐ
τολµῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκϰας λαγχάνειν, οὐδε µνησικϰακϰεῖν. By the
usual interpretation, this refers to a general amnesty barring
legal recourse for any wrongs committed in civil conflict. But it
is clear that property rights remain valid and returnees are
entitled to reclaim what is theirs. Citizens could take possession
of their land and houses and recover at least some of their
movable goods (whatever had not been sold). Thus Thrasybulus and Anytus recovered their real property and secured
whatever assets they could find, at the expense of those who
had taken possession. But even the champions of democracy
had not prosecuted the apograpsantes, those who had listed property for confiscation and received part of the proceeds.41 These
accomplices are protected, as Isocrates’ client claims to be, by
the covenant shielding “those who informed or denounced or
did anything of this sort.”
But the second count in the plea, that the matter is closed by
an arbitrated settlement, is perhaps more vital to the argument
because it serves to remind the jury (from common experience)
of just what it means to settle past grievances by contractual
agreement. This settlement was concluded as a diaita epi rhêtois.
In this sort of settlement the so-called arbitrator witnesses the
agreement and takes custody of the document; his duty is then
41 As S. C. Todd recognized, Athenian Internal Politics 403–395 BC with
Particular Reference to the Speeches of Lysias (diss. Cambridge 1985) 108. H.
Kühn, “Die Amnestie von 403 v. Chr. im Reflex der 18. Isokrates-Rede,”
WS N.F. 1 (1967) 31–73, at 64 n.47, accepted the rule regarding informants
and denouncers but discounted it in this case. T. Loening, The Reconciliation
Agreement of 403/2 B.C. in Athens (Stuttgart 1987) 56, discounted the rule; it
was implicit in the amnesty.
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to decide any dispute over compliance, if one party contends
that the other has violated the provisions for payment or other
performance.42 This arrangement is a way of guaranteeing the
finality of the settlement. It is that principle that is crucial to
this case and to the reconciliation. In accepting that settlement,
Callimachus has renounced his right to any further claim in
that matter. To amplify that principle Isocrates extols the “covenants” (synthêkai) and the contract for peace that was built
upon them (§§24–34). For that principle of finality is the essence of the pledge mê mnêsikakein that sealed the covenants of
the agreement that we call the Amnesty.
(b) The later speeches mention quite a number of grounds on
which to bar litigation: these include a statutory time-limit (prothesmia) and the rule against claims without jurisdiction.43 The
speakers sometimes refer to these rules as though they were
summarized in a general statute. Be that as it may, the grounds
cited in later proceedings seem to lack any common denominator other than procedural defect, and that feature has encouraged scholars to suppose that the paragraphê is divorced
from the main dispute, to be decided quite separately.
But it is doubtful whether all of those rules that declare suits
inadmissible (µὴ εἰσαγώγιµον τὴν δίκϰην or δίκϰας µὴ εἶναι)
might lead to a jury trial. While defendants in paragraphai often
reinforce their arguments with limitations on time or jurisdiction, these technicalities are never introduced as the principal
grounds for the plea to bar the plaintiff’s claim. In the speeches,
the defendants base their case on laws affirming specifically the
right to invoke the paragraphê (not simply that the suit is inadmissible); and those grounds for trial usually involve contractual
42 We have one other instance in this era: Isoc. 17.19. Cf. A. Steinwenter,
Die Streitbeendigung durch Urteil, Schiedsspruch und Vergleich nach griechischem Rechte
(Munich 1925) 135–140.
43 The various grounds to bar a lawsuit are reconstructed by Paoli, Processo 85–95 (esp. omnibus measures indicated at Dem. 36.25 and 38.5); by
Wolff, Paragraphe 90–105; Isager, Aspects 126–129.
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agreement.44 In many instances, purely procedural barriers
(such as time-limit or jurisdiction) might be addressed by the
archon or the arbitrator and would not in themselves constitute
an issue for the jury.45 Indeed, where those issues are brought
up in court, they are often introduced with a disclaimer: the
scrupulous defendant would not rely on such objections; the
procedural violation is merely a mark against the plaintiff’s
integrity. Thus Dem. 33.27 mentions the one-year limit for
sureties, only to dismiss it, οὐκϰ ἰσχυρϱίζοµαι τῷ νόµῳ. The defendants in Dem. 36.26 and 38.17–18 mention the five-year
limit for suits against guardians only as a yardstick by which to
measure the injustice, as (in each case) the suit comes twenty
years after settlement with full release.46
To judge from the cases represented in our speeches, the
paragraphai that went to trial were based on the laws that bar
litigation after “release and quittance” and those that deal with
contracts for mining or maritime trade.47 To be clear: it may
have been possible, in principle, to bring a paragraphê on the
Cf. Carawan, GRBS 46 (2006) 351–358, with n.47 below.
Thus in Lys. 17.5, we are told, the defendants got the suit against them
barred as being in the wrong jurisdiction (διεγρϱάψαντο), evidently dismissed
by the magistrates (without trial). In Dem. 37.33–34, where the defendant
invokes the rule barring suits “for which there are no eisagogeis,” he explains
that he originally included that in his plea, in preliminaries before the thesmothetai, but they erased it from the official formulation for trial. Similarly
Steinwenter (ZRG 54 [1934] 382–387) emphasized the shifting scope of the
archon’s discretion.
46 Esp. 38.18, τοῦ νόµου λέγοντος ἄντικϰρϱυς, ἐὰν µὴ πέντ’ ἐτῶν δικϰάσωνται, µηκϰέτ’ εἶναι δίκϰην. οὐκϰοῦν ἐλάχοµεν, φαῖεν ἄν. κϰαὶ διελύσασθέ γε,
ὥστ’ οὐκϰ εἰσὶν αὖθις ὑµῖν δίκϰαι (“But we did bring suit, they may say. Yes,
but you settled that suit, so you have no recourse”).
47 Aphesis and apallagê: Dem. 37.1 = 38.1. Maritime contracts: 32.1–2, 23–
24; 33.1–2, ἵνα µηδεὶς ἀδικϰῇ µηδένα τῶν ἐµπόρϱων εἰκϰῇ. τοῖς δὲ περϱὶ τῶν
µὴ γενοµένων συµβολαίων εἰς κϰρϱίσιν κϰαθισταµένοις ἐπὶ τὴν παρϱαγρϱαφὴν
κϰαταφεύγειν ἔδωκϰεν ὁ νόµος; 34.4, οἱ µὲν οὖν νόµοι … ὑπὲρϱ µὲν τῶν µὴ
γενοµένων ὅλως συµβολαίων Ἀθήνησι µηδ’ εἰς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐµπόρϱιον παρϱαγρϱάφεσθαι δεδώκϰασιν.
44
45
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basis on any law that says simply, “such suits are not admissible.” But among the speeches for trial there is no wide range
of issues; the cases all revolve around the finality of binding decisions. This principle encompasses the contractual settlement
of private quarrels and the covenants of business contracts that
foreclose any further dispute. It is beyond our scope to proceed
through all the arguments in detail; here it should be sufficient
to show how consistently the litigants embrace this principle in
the other speeches, long after the plea Against Callimachus.
Thus in the paragraphê against Apollodorus, For Phormio (as we
saw above, 263–264), the challenge to the lawsuit is based upon
earlier settlements that should have barred any further claim
on those matters. In the speech Against Pantaenetus the defendant
begins on the same note (Dem. 37.1), invoking the laws that
grant paragraphê against cases where a plaintiff has given release
and quittance and yet brings suit in the same matter. And the
speech Against Nausimachus (Dem. 38) begins with nearly the
same words: δεδωκϰότων … τῶν νόµων παρϱαγρϱάψασθαι περϱὶ ὧν
ἄν τις ἀφεὶς κϰαὶ ἀπαλλάξας πάλιν δικϰάζηται.
The contract cases (Dem. 32–35) develop a variation on that
theme. The defendants invoke the law authorizing suits in the
maritime court in matters “for which there are written
contracts (syngraphai) and obligations (symbolaia)” based on that
agreement; the law grants paragraphai against claims that are
barred by provisions of the contract.48
Wolff begins his analysis of the speeches with the case against
Apaturius (Dem. 33), because “[i]t shows with particular clarity
that the speaker is solely concerned with the question of
admissibility”; but it is also “an instructive example of how the
48 It was once supposed that this court heard cases based upon either written contract or (other) legal obligation: thus L Gernet, Droit et société dans la
Grèce ancienne (Paris 1955) 186–187; and that seems to be Wolff’s assumption,
notably in regard to Dem. 32. Most commentators are now reasonably convinced that this law for dikai emporikai effectively required a written contract,
and the symbolaia at issue depend upon that agreement: e.g. Todd, in Symposion 1993 136–137.
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speaker, by convoluted tactics, sometimes slighting the juristic
implications, was able to conceal his objective” (25–26). That
is, the defendant is unconcerned with the main issue—he is not
arguing against the claim as he would do in euthydikia—but in
order to see this, we must extricate the real issue from the diversions. We shall follow Wolff's exegesis below, but let us first
get a sense of what the defendant (NN) says the case is about.
This dispute has a history going back two years. The defendant tells it in detail, as though those events have some
bearing on the decision at hand. In brief: a shipowner from
Byzantium, Apaturius, relied upon his countryman Parmeno
and our Athenian defendant to lend him a sum of money,
putting up his ship as collateral; Apaturius then tried to abscond with the ship, but Parmeno intervened, seized the slave
crew. and stopped the ship. NN, in disgust, sold his share to a
company of bankers. Then all parties reconciled: the original
articles of agreement, the synthêkai, were destroyed; and the
parties formalized their settlement with release and quittance
(aphesis and apallagê)—“so that I would have no further business
with [Apaturius] nor he with me” (12). He calls witnesses and
emphasizes this conclusion: “Since then I have had no contractual bond with him, whatever” (13, µετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐµοὶ
µὲν οὔτε µεῖζον οὔτ᾽᾿ ἔλαττον πρϱὸς αὐτὸν συµβολαῖον γέγονεν).
Of course that was not the end of it. Parmeno brought suit
against Apaturius, for assault, because of the beating he got
when the slaves were taken. Then Apaturius apparently evaded
a challenge to decide the dispute by oath and instead brought a
counter complaint against Parmeno (14). Thereupon they
agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration and drew up covenants governing the procedure (γρϱάψαντες συνθήκϰας).
That document is the crux of the case at hand. As NN tells it,
the covenants specified that the arbitrators were to deliver a
verdict that would be binding upon the two parties, if the three
arbitrators were unanimous or two concurred; NN was one of
the three arbitrators. But Apaturius contends that one arbitrator, Aristocles was to decide the case; the other two were
merely mediators (and NN was one of them). Now, in Apa—————
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turius’ version, NN was named as surety for Parmeno, and that
is the basis for his claim against him.
As NN tells it, the lead arbitrator was an impartial compatriot of the litigants, Phocritus; but when Apaturius realized
that Phocritus was leaning against him, he insisted that the
document of their agreement be entrusted to Aristocles—who
was also his surety. He then claimed that Aristocles was sole arbitrator, with full power to decide the case. But when Aristocles
was called upon to prove this claim from the covenants, he said
the document had been lost (18). After this impasse, the parties
tried again to draft an agreement for arbitration, but each insisted upon the arrangement most favorable to his cause. So, by
NN's description, the effort to reach a settlement failed: the
original covenants were now disputed and there was no document by which to decide the dispute. Nonetheless, Aristocles
asserted his authority and was on the point of pronouncing a
verdict in favor of his man, Apaturius; but Parmeno confronted
him and rejected a unilateral decision as a violation of their
agreement. Soon thereafter, however, Parmeno left town to
deal with a personal disaster (for his family had been devastated
by an earthquake). Yet, though both of the other arbitrators
disavowed the process, Aristocles proceeded to make an award
of twenty minas to Apaturius. And, with Parmeno unavailable
to contest it, there the matter remained for two years, until
Apaturius decided to sue NN as surety for the delinquent Parmeno.
Now it may be helpful to summarize the sequence in even
shorter compass. There was first a contract to pay off liens on
the ship; this led to a dispute which was resolved in arbitration,
with release and quittance. There were then cross claims for assault, which led to a second agreement for arbitration; but that
agreement was nullified when the document was lost and the
parties could not agree on the arrangements. And yet NN is
now sued as surety for a judgment that was rendered under
that second, defective agreement.
Without the document, the plaintiff relies on what witnesses
will recall. And, as Wolff observed, the defendant apparently
—————
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has no witnesses present to confirm his side of the case, that he
was not surety for Parmeno, that in fact Archippus had stepped
into that role. Instead the “witnesses” that NN promised (22)
turn out to be purely figurative. Thus he cites the time that
passed as “witness”; for there is a statute of limitations barring
any action against a surety more than a year after the judgment. Of course, our defendant will not insist upon that limitation, but it gives him an argument from probability: Apaturius
was in Athens within that period and would not have missed
the opportunity, if he had a legitimate claim. The only live testimony in this regard is introduced to prove that Apaturius was
indeed present in Athens the year before (26).
In Wolff’s view, all the lengthy narrative and elaborate argument over events long past are merely a cloak for the frailty of
our defendant’s case. The main claim is that NN is liable as
surety, and Apaturius will have witnesses to that effect.49 By
this reckoning, the proof that the first round of the quarrel was
resolved with full release is irrelevant; and the ground for the
paragraphê, the claim that NN cannot be sued in the maritime
court because there is no contract, is a very precarious footing.
Every turn of the argument reveals some new diversion concealing the lack of evidence: Why did NN not call Archippus
himself to testify that the latter was named surety?50 As for the
missing document, Wolff suggests that “many jurors may have
suspected that the text was stolen ... at Parmeno's urging!” In
§29, NN seems to recognize the distinction between procedural
and factual issues only to confuse them: if he had been named
surety he would never have denied it, “for the arbitrator’s verdict was not according to contract, so I would not be liable as
49

case.

Cf. Isager, Aspects 152, against Wolff’s theory of the symbolaion in this

50 Wolff raises the point, Paragraphe 32: “Why does he not produce the
supposed surety Archippus?”; if he were deceased, defendant would surely
have invoked that excuse. But then, in an added n.25a, Wolff concedes that
Archippus would probably have fled rather than face litigation.

—————
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surety.” Thus, in Wolff’s view, he practically concedes that his
argument on the facts is beside the point.
Of course we should not make too much of the litigants’ narrative.51 But we should also be wary of our own assumptions
where they run counter to the text. If we assume that the
paragraphê hearing is all about the procedural barrier, then, of
course, all of the argument on the main issue is simply a
strategy of evasion.52 To be sure, NN has an awkward gap in
the evidence: the contract is missing and he has no witness to
prove that he was not named surety. But I doubt that failing to
prove the negative would be decisive. After all, is it really surprising that Archippus is not anxious to step into the defendant’s role and make himself liable? In this instance, just as
in the other speeches, the defendant paragrapsamenos seems compelled to argue on the merits as well as the procedural issues—
to prove both that the plaintiff’s suit is contrary to the laws and
that his claim is fraudulent. That the defendant devotes so
much of his argument to the question of fact—where he is
weakest—only proves that it is unavoidable.
Far from foreshadowing a separate hearing on the merits,
this speech again, like the previous examples, closes with a
glance at further recourse, beyond the proceedings at hand.
51 Wolff, Paragraphe 24, against “Spekulationen über den objectiven
Wahrheitsgehalt ihrer Darlegungen …; solche sind ja ohnehin fast ausnahmlos müßige Spielerei und juristisch zumeist ohne jeden Belang.”
52 Paragraphe 32–33: “In this predicament, if there was any remaining
hope for this defendant, it was this, that the court would simply vote against
admitting the case to trial on the merits, on this account, that the plaintiffs
could not present the document to disprove the τεκϰµήρϱια by which defendant sought to render improbable the assumption of surety on his part
(§§23–29). Perhaps he could still count on the judges to maintain a strict
standard of proof in the paragraphê [requiring the document to prove the
contract] where it was foremost at issue whether a contract actually existed.
In euthydikia, … the only question in dispute would be whether that obligation came due; [in that case] there was the danger that the court would
take a more flexible attitude toward undocumented proofs which defendant
could not contradict with other evidence.”

—————
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NN speaks as though the normal expectation would be for him
to sue the witnesses who support Apaturius: if he loses the case
at hand, he can bring a ψευδοµαρϱτυρϱίων δίκϰη to recover his
loss. But in that case, he protests, what basis will either side
have to argue from, since the document itself is missing? “If he
says it is lost, where shall I find proof that I am victim of false
testimony?” Conversely, if the defendant had been custodian of
the document, Apaturius would surely claim that he had gotten
rid of it: “So why doesn’t Apaturius sue Aristocles, the one who
took custody of the covenants and failed to produce them …
instead of suing me and producing him as a witness?” (37–38).
The defendant’s only recourse, if he loses the hearing at hand,
would be to do just that, to sue Aristocles. If there were to be
further arguments in a hearing on the merits, we might expect
him to acknowledge it. Instead he ends with the same words he
would use in any ordinary trial: εἴρϱηταί µοι τὰ δίκϰαια, ὅσα
ἐδυνάµην. ὑµεῖς οὖν κϰατὰ τοὺς νόµους γιγνώσκϰετε τὰ δίκϰαια.
In the suit of Demon against Zenothemis, Dem. 32, once
again the argument turns upon missing evidence: the agent
who was directly responsible for the transaction and for the loss
would be the crucial witness, but he is nowhere to be found.
Again, the statutory basis for the paragraphê is the law for the
maritime courts, and this defendant invokes the same text of
law cited against Apaturius. In this case, however, the special
plea is grounded in the contention that “there is no contract”
between the plaintiff and defendant.53 In Wolff’s view, that objection amounts to a procedural ploy: if an action for damage
or ejectment were brought in ordinary court, Demon would
have no grounds to bar the suit simply because “there is no
contract,” and that plea in bar is dubious here.
The background to the case is, briefly, as follows. Protus had
borrowed from Demon (D), in order to purchase grain at Syracuse and ship it back to Athens for sale. As D tells it, once the
This is also the basis for the paragraphê in Dem. 35; on the contract in
this case see Carawan, GRBS 46 (2006) 355–357.
53

—————
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grain was loaded in Syracuse, Zenothemis (Z) conspired with
the shipowner Hegestratus to raise further loans by pretending
that the cargo on board was theirs (whereas Z had no legitimate claim to it). Now, the borrowers owe nothing if the ship
goes down with its cargo. So, after two days at sea, Hegestratus
tried to scuttle his ship; he was discovered, tried to escape, but
was drowned. The ship managed to make port in Cephallenia,
and there Z came forward with a claim upon the cargo, urging
that the ship should proceed to Marseille, his own and Hegestratus’ home port. But the officials in Cephallenia ordered
the ship to proceed to Athens.
In Athens Protus was barred from taking possession of the
grain by Z, who thus asserted his claim to it. Protus would then
have recourse to “ejectment”—to take possession of the cargo.
But Protus was reluctant to use force, and Z refused to give up
the goods voluntarily. It was only when D arrived on the scene
that Z agreed to go peacefully, on condition that D would be
responsible for the ejectment. Z then brought legal action
against Protus and against D, the latter by suit for ejectment,
dike exoulês.54 The case against Protus was quickly resolved in
favor of Z: as Protus did not appear before the arbitrator, the
case went by default. Meanwhile Z proceeded against D for the
ejectment, arguing that he had been wrongfully deprived of
goods that he had a legitimate claim to.
Now in framing the issue Demon explains the paragraphê as
follows (1–2):
The laws [for the maritime court] provide for lawsuits involving
shipowners and merchants in obligations for shipment to and from
Athens, and where there are written agreements;55 but if anyone prosecute contrary to these provisions, the suit is not actionable (µὴ
εἰσαγώγιµον εἶναι τὴν δίκϰην). Between me and this fellow
On the dike exoulês see Isager, Aspects 144–147.
This and similar cases point to a restrictive reading: only obligations
based on written agreements are actionable in this court (see n.48 above); cf.
Isager, Aspects 151–152; D. M. MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator (Oxford
2009) 275 with n.60, on this case.
54
55
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Zenothemis there is neither obligation nor written agreement, as
he himself admits in his complaint; for he says that he loaned
money to Hegestratus, the shipowner, and when the latter was
lost at sea, we deprived him (Z) of his cargo. Such is the complaint. From the very same argument you will learn that the
claim is not actionable and you will see that this fellow has invented the whole sorry scheme.56

The procedural issue amounts to this: Z has a claim based
upon a maritime contract and he therefore asserts his right to
bring suit in the maritime court; D insists that the maritime
suits are properly reserved for obligations based on a contract
between the two parties, not upon some incidental agreement with
a third party. And that is not merely a technicality; for he argues at length that Z’s claim to the goods in question is entirely
fraudulent—he borrowed money on goods that were not his.
Wolff discounts that whole argument: once again, the paragraphê
is a desperate last resort. Were the case to go to trial on the
main issue, whether D had wrongly ejected Z, the plaintiff
would surely prevail.57 But where is the contract linking D to
Z?
Wolff's answer is intriguing—the ejectment itself creates a
viable obligation:58
56 Dem. 32.1–2: οἱ νόµοι κϰελεύουσιν, ὦ ἄνδρϱες δικϰασταί, τὰς δίκϰας εἶναι
τοῖς ναυκϰλήρϱοις κϰαὶ τοῖς ἐµπόρϱοις τῶν Ἀθήναζε κϰαὶ τῶν Ἀθήνηθεν συµβολαίων κϰαὶ περϱὶ ὧν ἂν ὦσι συγγρϱαφαί· ἂν δέ τις παρϱὰ ταῦτα δικϰάζηται,
µὴ εἰσαγώγιµον εἶναι τὴν δίκϰην. τουτῳὶ τοίνυν Ζηνοθέµιδι πρϱὸς µὲν ἐµὲ
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἦν συµβόλαιον οὐδὲ συγγρϱαφή, κϰαὐτὸς ὁµολογεῖ ἐν τῷ ἐγκϰλήµατι· δανεῖσαι δέ φησιν Ἡγεστρϱάτῳ ναυκϰλήρϱῳ, τούτου δ’ ἀπολοµένου ἐν
τῷ πελάγει, ἡµᾶς τὸ ναῦλον σφετερϱίσασθαι· τουτὶ τὸ ἔγκϰληµ’ ἐστίν. ἐκϰ δὴ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου τήν τε δίκϰην οὐκϰ εἰσαγώγιµον οὖσαν µαθήσεσθε, κϰαὶ τὴν
ὅλην ἐπιβουλὴν κϰαὶ πονηρϱίαν τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀνθρϱώπου ὄψεσθε.
57 Cf. Paragraphe 42 with n.53, emphasizing the disparity in evidence.
58 Paragraphe 44–45 with n.56: “prozessual ging es ja gar nicht um die (gerechtfertigte oder ungerechtfertigte) Besitzergreifung des Protos, und nach
ihm des Demon, an dem Getreide, sondern um die von letzterem vollzogene ἐξαγωγή. Diese aber war gerade das formale Mittel zur Schaffung einer
(deliktischen) Haftungsbeziehung—und diese allgemeine Bedeutung, nicht bloß
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In processual terms it is not a matter of taking possession of the
grain (rightly or wrongly) on the part of Protus or Demo, but
rather of the latter's executed ejectment. But this was just the
formal means of creating a (delictual) obligation—and this
general meaning, not simply “contract,” belongs to symbolaion!—
on which grounds the very party who has been wrongfully
barred from taking possession (and this is precisely the claim of
Zenothemis) can proceed with a dike exoulês.

Wrongs create liabilities, indeed, and the Athenians certainly
described such obligations as symbolaia. Moreover, Z agreed to be
ejected by D, with the understanding that he could later bring
suit to recover what he lost. But to suppose that this form of
liability meets the requirement for “contract” in that jurisdiction seems to me as doubtful as any of the strategies that Wolff
imputes to the desperate defendants. Wolff supposed that the
maritime court would normally have jurisdiction in cases of
ejectment involving imported goods.59 But that does not quite
square with the evidence (as most scholars now read it): the law
for paragraphê in this jurisdiction makes it reasonably clear that
the defendant can bar any claim that is not based on a written
contract, syngraphai (nn.48 and 55 above). The practical effect of
that rule would be that other kinds of claims (such as wrongful
ejectment), without a contract to establish the claimant’s right
to the goods, do not belong in this court. So in this case, as in
other mercantile paragraphai, the rule defining jurisdiction is not
merely a procedural distinction: by barring claims without a
contract, it recognizes the defendant’s right to goods he has
secured by contract.
___

die von ‘Vertrag’, hat συµβόλαιον!—auf Grund deren derjenige, dessen
Zugriff zu Unrecht abgewehrt worden war, und eben das nahm Zenothemis
für sich in Anspruch, mit der δίκϰη ἐξουλῆς vorgehen konnte.” For this
“delictual” liability (non-consensual symbolaion) see esp. Arist. Eth.Nic. 9.1.9,
1164b.
59 As Wolff explains, Paragraphe 45: “Insofern als nun diese der Sache
nach allerdings eine stilisierte Form der Austragung des Streits um das Gut
selbst war, und es sich im vorliegenden Falle um Einfuhrgut handelte,
mochte man wohl die Zuständigkeit des Hafengerichts für gegeben halten.”

—————
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If we follow Wolff’s interpretation the sole issue in the paragraphê is the purely jurisdictional distinction:60 D has no interest
in arguing about the facts because the preponderance of the
evidence is on the plaintiff’s side. D would be happy to see the
case dismissed on procedural grounds, since the maritime court
was the only venue where Z had any case.61
But the natural implication of this speech—as in the other
Demosthenic speeches—is that the bearing of the contract is
not regarded as a formality divorced from the facts. There is
often the question of fraud. And there is always the question of
whether the claim has been foreclosed. The formal issue is a
question of whether there is any viable claim based on the contract. But in this case and others like it, that question is bound
up with substantive questions about the plaintiff’s right to what
he claims: What was done to create the obligation or to undo
it?
The argument ends abruptly in §30 with a reference to unfinished business.62 D accuses Z once again of conspiring with
Protus to deprive him of his property; the proof is that he,
Demon, will avail himself of klêteusis, whereas Z has no intention of resorting to that remedy. As Wolff acknowledged,
κϰλητεύσω probably indicates a formal commitment by D to
proceed against Protus for “failing to appear” (lipomartyria). So
60 From this perspective, treating the paragraphê as exceptio fori, Wolff dismisses the argument in §22 as “sophistic wordplay.” Here the speaker treats
the term eisagôgimos/eisagein literally, as though it refers to bringing the
disputed goods (or the culprit) into the court’s jurisdiction, and I am not so
sure the Athenians would see it as facetious or sophistic. That literal sense of
eisagôgimos/eisagein is also key to the commonplace in Dem. 34.43 and 35.47–
49 (see 265–267 above, 288 below).
61 Paragraphe 43 with n.54. Wolff assumes that Z might sue in another
court but the risk is minimal.
62 That is, D has already summoned Protus to give testimony at the present hearing and, of course, he fails to appear. The concluding sections, 31–
32, anticipate some accusations against Demosthenes, of no relevance to the
main argument.

—————
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here again, as in the case against Apaturius, the only recourse is
to prosecute the witness; no one anticipates a separate hearing
on the merits.
3. Ending the dispute
Not long after Wolff’s study appeared, MacDowell set to
work on the second volume of The Law of Athens (1971), which
Harrison had left unfinished. There Wolff’s model is articulated at length (106–124), and MacDowell would later follow
that model in his own handbook (1978). And with such authority on his side, it is no surprise that Wolff has “demolished”
Paoli’s hypothesis and the matter is not to open to dispute.63
The plaintiffs present their whole case only because they will be
denied a proper hearing if the paragraphê prevails. And, however
much the defendants delve into the facts, they are pinning all
their arguments on the procedural issue because they have no
case on the merits. Thus we are to conclude that the two issues
were clearly distinct and properly assigned to separate hearings.64 But the fact that defendants would have been at a grave
disadvantage in a hearing on the merits, or that plaintiffs had
to present their case as though they might not get another
chance, does not prove that there ever was a second hearing.
That conclusion is based on the assumption (“nothing to prevent our believing”) that the Athenians divided the issues and
assigned them to separate hearings, much as later law would
do.
Those who rely on that premise find reassurance in some
63 Harrison, Law of Athens II 111, “there is nothing … to weaken the view
that the issue raised by the παρϱαγρϱαφή was treated quite separately from the
main issue”; 112 “nothing to prevent our believing that the issue … was
whether suit lay against Lakritos”; 116, “nothing to suggest that the principal aim … was to persuade the jury on the merits …”
64 Law of Athens II 119: “We can say with some confidence that argument
and voting on a παρϱαγρϱαφή were quite distinct from argument and voting
on the issue of substance and that when the παρϱαγρϱαφή was rejected a new
hearing, quite possibly though not necessarily before a different jury, was
opened.”
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rather dubious evidence. There is of course the testimony of
Pollux and the later lexica. But that tradition draws on rhetorical hypotheses rather than speeches-for-trial or any credible
record of the law: the standard examples are cases rejected as
not suited for eisangelia but for graphê paranomôn, or not for public
prosecution but private suit, or not (for murder) before the
Areopagus but (for manslaughter) before the Palladium court.65
These instances have nothing to do with the paragraphê procedure at Athens in the fourth century B.C.; they illustrate issue
theory.
But there is an exceptio fori in the plea of Pancleon addressed
by Lysias 23, and the testimony in Pollux has encouraged
scholars to suppose that Pancleon’s plea is indeed a paragraphê.
So Wilamowitz assumed though, by his reading, the plaintiff
speaks first. It is fair to say, the order of speakers is not quite
clear.66 But there is no doubt about the disparity: this argument
bears no similarity to the other paragraphê speeches. As we have
seen, the other paragraphai never rely on such technicalities;
when such objections are raised, they always come with a disclaimer (nn.45–46 above). The most striking difference is
simply that Against Pancleon makes no argument at all on the
merits—indeed, we have no clear indication what the plaintiff’s
claim happens to be.67 Scholars have seized on that disparity as
proof that the hearing at hand would only decide the question
of jurisdiction, but it seems to me at least as likely that in this
65 Poll. 8.57: οἷον οὐκϰ εἰσαγγελίας ἀλλὰ παρϱανόµων, οὐ δηµοσίᾳ ἀλλ’
ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὡς οὐ παρϱὰ τούτοις κϰρϱίνεσθαι δέον, οἷον οὐκϰ ἐν Ἀρϱείῳ πάγῳ ἀλλ’
ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ. See n.13 above.
66 Thus Isager, Aspects 124 n.5, concluding (with Wolff, Paragraphe 108–
111) “that a ‘normal’ paragraphe is at issue.”
67 As we noted at the outset (259–261 above). It is tempting to suppose
that the case involves enslavement for debt or damages by a freedman with
(supposedly) metic status (on which see Todd, Shape 181, 196). In the
competing claims it is clear that Pancleon risks losing his liberty and so it is
likely that NN’s suit may have the same effect (thus, §5, he takes pains not to
be accused of ὑβρϱίζειν).

—————
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singular case the main claim required no speechwriter’s assistance. In the other speeches there is always an account of the
dispute ἐξ ἀρϱχῆς. So it seems reasonable to suppose that Pancleon’s plea is simply called antigraphê because it is not a paragraphê.68
Among all the other speeches the only passage that seems to
point specifically to a second stage of the proceedings comes in
the testimony with which we began, Isocrates’ prologue explaining the procedure: the archons “introduce this issue first
and the man who brought the special plea would speak first.”69
By itself, the first clause, τοὺς δ’ ἄρϱχοντας περϱὶ τούτου πρϱῶτον
εἰσάγειν, might suggest that the issues are treated separately:
the archons introduce the first question first, and then bring on
the sequel. But the phrasing is not unequivocal, and this clause
should not be taken apart from what follows. Apparently the
law does not say “bring in the paragraphê first and thereafter the
dikê.” Isocrates describes the issue elliptically: the archon is to
“bring in” something “about this (dispute).”70 What is it that he
brings in?
The Athenian jury probably understood the phrase περϱὶ
τούτου … εἰσάγειν not as an abstraction but in practical terms:
the archon will introduce the issue that the defendant has
raised by having his formal plea, his antômosia, read out to the
court. To put it another way, he introduces the issue by “bringing in” the defendant who raised it.71 That is not to say that the
68 Pollux, in fact, in the next entry after paragraphê, notes the overlap and
the differences (8.58, ἀντιγρϱαφὴ δέ, ὅταν τις κϰρϱινόµενος ἀντικϰατηγορϱῇ).
69 As for the passage where the plaintiff calls defendant to answer, see
n.29 above.
70 Cf. the law cited in Dem. 24.54 (ne bis in idem) µὴ εἰσάγειν περϱὶ τούτων
εἰς τὸ δικϰαστήρϱιον µηδ’ ἐπιψηφίζειν τῶν ἀρϱχόντων µηδένα; 35.51: µηδὲ
ἀρϱχὴ εἰσαγέτω περϱὶ τούτου µηδεµία (money lost in transporting grain elsewhere).
71 E.g. Isoc. Antidosis 287 (no one has “brought in” those who encourage
the drunken youth); Lys. 13. 28 (“bring in” defendants to the council under
the Thirty); cf. the law in Dem. 21.47, where defendants are omitted but
naturally implied (οἱ δὲ θεσµοθέται εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν).
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Athenians could not conceptualize the “issue” as an abstract
question or could not speak of “introducing a dispute,” ἀγῶνα
εἰσάγειν. But, without such language, the ordinary implication
seems to be that the archon literally “brings in” the litigants
and that introduction is represented in the statements that he
has read for them.
So, in practical terms, the likely meaning of Isocrates’ description is simply that the archon has the paragraphê read
before the plaint. That presentation to the court comes first (of
all), πρϱῶτον. And then the defendant speaks first or, strictly, prior
to the plaintiff (λέγειν δὲ πρϱότερϱον τὸν παρϱαγρϱαψάµενον). This
second rule uses the more precise way of setting one event
before another, because the reverse order is the surprise that
requires an explanation. If there were separate proceedings for
the main issue, and a second decision for the jury to make after
the paragraphê, that would also be novel and perhaps confusing,
and we might expect some guidance on that new protocol:
πρϱῶτον µὲν περϱὶ τούτου εἰσάγειν … ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν δίκϰην. Instead Isocrates seems to suppose that the jury would normally
expect a plea of this sort, that the plaintiff is abusing the procedure, to be simply part of the defendant’s argument (as in
Antiphon 5). Now it is presented at the outset and that reversal
alters the dispute. But there is nothing to suggest that the jury
are to decide the defendant’s objection first and only then proceed to
plaintiff’s case, though that would be the crucial departure
from the norm. If that were the order of business, surely the
jurors should be advised that they have only to decide on the
procedural issue at present and may reserve judgment on the
merits until later. So, in my view, “introduce this issue first”
simply refers to the fact that the defendant is introduced first,
with the reading of his paragraphê, and he will begin the debate.
After all, it takes two sides to frame an issue, and it looks as
though the plaintiff’s side is simply his original claim against
the defendant. If the jury were to decide the procedural question apart from the main issue, we might expect the plaintiff to
enter a formal reply, perhaps even a separate antômosia on that
question: if the paragrapsamenos claims that the suit is barred by a
—————
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settlement with full release (for instance), the plaintiff would respond specifically to that challenge—presumably that the settlement was invalid. The defendants sometimes begin by referring
to the wording of the paragraphê, which the jury has just heard,
but there is no reference to any formal response to the paragraphê, even in the plaintiffs’ speeches (Dem. 34–35). We can
reconstruct their positions from the arguments, but there seems
to be no official formulation on that separate question.72 Thus,
in the first instance (Isoc. 18), the defendant proceeds as though
he does not know what Callimachus will say specifically in response to his plea.73 The only answer to the paragraphê is the
plaint.
If we set aside the usual assumption and simply form our
judgment from the speeches themselves, there is nothing to
suggest that the jury must separate the two questions and decide one before the other. On the contrary, the events that
created the obligation and the course that the plaintiff has
taken to recover what is owed to him are not easily divisible.
Therefore, to the Athenians it seemed reasonable and sufficient
for one verdict to answer both questions, because the paragraphê
72 See esp. Dem. 34.3–5, where the plaintiff does give a fairly succinct
reply; 35.4–5, where the plaintiff largely discounts the paragraphê and pleads,
“If I convict him of wronging us, the lenders—and (doing wrong to) you no
less—aid us with justice,” βοηθεῖτε ἡµῖν τὰ δίκϰαια. G. M. Calhoun,
“Athenian Magistrates and Special Pleas,” CP 14 (1919) 338–350, supposed
that that there must have been some formal reply to the paragraphê in the
preliminaries, but he acknowledged that there is no indication of it in the
speeches; in fact, Dem. 37.22–30 suggests that “the original complaint and
the παρϱαγρϱαφή seem to constitute the pleadings” (345 n.5).
73 Isoc. 18.7 and 13, show that C has not answered the paragraphê in the
statement that has just been read to the court: NN says, “perhaps” C will
claim that NN was the instigator of the confiscation (in response to the plea
that NN is shielded by the covenant on informants); and “I learn that” C
intends to deny the arbitration. The complaint was read in its original form,
specifying the damages (§33). Similarly in Dem. 38.1–2 it seems clear that
the plaintiff’s statement is his original claim for damages in the specific
amount, ἐπὶ τῇ δίκϰῃ τίµηµ᾽᾿ ἀκϰηκϰόατε.

—————
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is a complete defense and the plaintiff will have made the best
of his case, in a dispute that cannot be parsed without prejudice.
For in these trials the issue is essentially whether the plaintiff’s claim is backed by binding agreement or foreclosed by it.
The defendant gains the advantage of speaking first and framing the debate to his advantge, as he argues that any claim is
canceled. If he prevails he wins the epôbelia and the plaintiff will
pay for his litigiousness. But the plaintiff has the last word and,
to make the most of it, he introduces all his evidence and
follows all the implications. The jurors will vote once, for one
litigant or the other—they do not decide on a formality. If the
paragraphê is rejected, the plaintiff prevails and he earns the
epôbelia in addition to his damages. That appears to be the
working rationale when Archinus introduced the procedure,
and we find the same principle at work in the last of the surviving speeches.
When the procedure was brand new, Isocrates argued that
Callimachus’ claim was strictly barred by the covenants of
reconciliation. Among those articles of agreement was the rule
that suits and settlements be binding. That principle was restated in subsequent legislation: “Whatever terms the parties
agree to shall be final.” Thus he argues, a fortiori, when private
agreements are enforced by public authority (τὰς µὲν ἰδίας
ὁµολογίας δηµοσίᾳ κϰυρϱίας ἀναγκϰάζετ’ εἶναι), it is all the more
outrageous for Callimachus to violate the city’s covenants to
serve his own private interest (18.24–26). The Athenians swore
to those covenants as part of a binding transaction, with stipulations to foreclose any further dispute: returnees may reclaim
much of their property, and whatever settlements they devise
shall be final. Now, as Isocrates puts it, they are asked to violate
their pledge in the interest of predatory litigators such as Callimachus. So the jury must recognize that they are casting a
verdict on the very viability of covenants (synthêkai) as the mainstay of commerce and civil society (28):
… most of our way of life, for Greeks and non-Greeks alike,
happens through covenants. Putting our trust in them we visit
—————
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one another and transport whatever goods we happen to need;
with [covenants] we complete our transactions among ourselves;
and we settle our differences, both private quarrels and wars
that involve the whole community. This one common practice
all mankind have always applied. So it is fitting for all to come to
their aid, and especially fitting for you.

In this passage the principle defended by the new procedure is
the package of rules that the parties had agreed to. The sanctity
of covenant is represented on two levels: it is not only the
Amnesty at large that demands compliance, but also private
agreements that are concluded with binding formality. For the
Reconciliation Agreement evidently embraced the rule that
legal judgments and arbitrated settlements (concluded under
the democracy) shall be final, and that rule was then enacted
into law.74 The law for the new paragraphê procedure seems to
have come on the heels of that enactment, perhaps even as
corollary to it.
The later laws granting paragraphai in various venues extended the reach of that remedy, but the later speeches all
embrace the same principle in one way or another. In the contract cases, the dispute is about binding agreement at the most
basic level. The two defendants, in Dem. 32 and 33, argue that
they are not subject to any obligation of this sort. The essence
of that rule is that proper contracts dispose of any further
dispute (33.35–36):
The crux of the matter is this: Apaturius will not even try to
claim that he has a contract with me. When he lies and says that
I was listed as surety in the contract with Parmeno, demand (to
see) the contract. And then confront him on this ground, that all
men, when they make contracts with one another, seal the document and put it in the custody of those they trust, for this reason
—so that if they have any dispute, they have recourse to the text
and on that basis they can put the matter in dispute to the proof.
74 With Isoc. 18.24 (ἰδίας ὁµολογίας δηµοσίᾳ κϰυρϱίας) compare Andoc.
1.87–88, among reforms inspired by the Amnesty; Dem. 24.54, canceling
decisions under the Thirty; cf. Carawan, GRBS 46 (2006) 368–372.
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The two plaintiffs, in Dem. 34 and 35, argue on the other side,
that contracts must be enforced against defendants who have
done all they can to evade their obligations. Both parties argue
the merits because questions of fact and fraud are inseparable
from the question of whether the claim has any basis in binding
agreement. The plaintiff against Lacritus frames the issue as
follows (35.26–27):
What is agreed by both parties, in covenants for which a maritime contract is secured, everyone considers final (τέλος ἔχειν);
one has to apply what is written. That they have done nothing
according to the contract but from the very beginning committed fraud and plotted to do wrong, is proven by the witnesses
and by their own claims.

But the clearest instances come from the last three speeches in
the set, Dem. 36–38: in each case prior settlements, solemnized
with release and quittance, bar any further dispute; that basis is
set forth in the prologues (as we saw, 274 ff. above). And the
principle of finalty is thoroughly developed in defendants’ arguments. Thus in the epilogues to the last two speeches (37.58–59
= 38.21–22) we find it framed as a commonplace: even in matters of bloodshed—the most unquenchable grievances—once
the parties have reconciled and given release to the killer, there
must be a boundary barring any further recrimination. It is the
same principle embodied in the closing to the Amnesty (cf.
Dem. 40.46).
Again the first case is perhaps the best illustration (Isoc. 18).
In their original settlement NN conceded his share in the loss,
as he had been present when Patrocles took the money; Callimachus settled for that concession and gave a release from
further claims. That should have ended the matter. But it is
clear from NN’s presentation that C has changed his construction of the events: presumably he claims that NN was the
main actor and now fully liable; on this issue, C contends,
“there was no diaita.” That at least is a plausible interpretation
of what NN says: C was able to convince the archon to reopen
the case by arguing that this is a new complaint of a more
serious wrong, one that was (arguably) exempt from the agree—————
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ment and from the covenants of reconciliation.
Evidently, by claiming that NN is not a mere accomplice, C
hopes to evade the covenant shielding “informants and denouncers.” There were no definitions in the law, but, to make a
good case, C probably needed to show that NN was the prime
mover, acting from his own motives, to his own advantage. It
looks as though the evidence on that is doubtful or C’s construction is precarious, based on NN’s ties to the discredited
regime. That is why our defendant insists upon it:75
If he mentions what happened under the oligarchy, demand that
he not accuse those whom no one will defend. Demand instead
that he show that I—the person you must vote on—took the
money. Demand not that he show that he has suffered terribly,
but that he substantiate that I caused it, (as I am) the one from
whom he is demanding to recover his losses.

Whereas Paoli treated this passage as proof that the main claim
will be decided in the hearing at hand, Wolff discounted it as a
rhetorical appeal to a general amnesty. But the issue is more
clearly defined: the defendant insists upon this point precisely
because there was a covenant specifically barring any claim of
mere complicity in the crime; and the alternative, the charge
that NN (or anyone) “caused it,” may be very difficult to prove.
C will argue that NN was the main actor, who set the events in
motion, to his own advantage. But that picture involves a
complicated reckoning that NN asks the jury to reduce to its
simplest terms. And it is all the more burdensome for the
plaintiff, if the jurors weigh the prior agreement that Callimachus made with this same defendant: How can Callimachus
claim such a sum for a loss he has already settled in arbitration,
pledging “no further dispute”?
Awkward as it is, the jury’s decision does not involve sophisticated distinctions of fact and form. It is the sort of problem
that neighbors and business partners wrestled with all the time,
settling their own disputes and defining their obligations. There
75

Isoc. 18.40, again following Mirhady’s translation.
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was no elite judiciary to parse these complexities, and the archons had no competence to dispose of them summarily. These
were cases for a jury representing the community to decide, not
on a formality but for one litigant or the other.
March, 2011

Modern and Classical Languages
Missouri State Univ.
Springfield, MO 65897
ECarawan@missouristate.edu

—————

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 51 (2011) 254–295

